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Summary 
Latin America had never seen an electoral agenda so intense – nor through popular suffrage such a 
profound and simultaneous political change – as it has in the past 14 months. This agenda comes as 
Latin America seems to be embarking on an about-face with regard to its record over the past 28 
years, since the start of the Third Wave of democracy.* 
 
Introduction 
Unlike the period 2003-20041, in which less than 13% of the 500 million people of Latin America 
elected new presidents, from November 2005 through the end of 2006 the region engaged in a 
flurry of electoral activity. Two countries in the Southern Cone (Brazil and Chile), the five nations 
of the Andean region (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela), three in Central America 
(Costa Rica, Honduras and Nicaragua) and Mexico - 11 out of a total of 18 countries – held 
presidential elections which etched out a new political map for the region. In nine of the 11 
countries, legislative voting was held at the same time as the presidential election; there were non-
simultaneous elections in Venezuela (one year before the presidential voting); near concurrent 
voting in Colombia (two months before the presidential election) and mid-term elections in two 
countries (El Salvador and the Dominican Republic).2 Meanwhile two referendums were held – one 
in Bolivia and one in Panama -- and elections to a constituent assembly were conducted in Bolivia.  
 
If we add to this the general elections in Canada (January 2006), in which the conservative 
opposition won, the mid-term elections in the US (November 2006) which dealt a severe blow to 
President Bush and his Republican Party and the presidential elections in Haiti (February 2006) 
which led to the return of President Preval, one can say that not just Latin America but rather most 
of the continent’s population went to the polls during this 14-month period.3 
 
The exceptional nature of this burst of electoral activity does have two precedents in the period 
since the region returned to democracy in 1978: the years 1989 and 1994. In 1989 presidential 
elections were held in nine countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay, while in 1994 voters in eight countries chose new presidents, in 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, the Dominican Republic and 
Uruguay. However, despite its importance, Latin America had never seen an electoral agenda so 
intense – nor through popular suffrage such a profound and simultaneous political change – as it has 
in the past 14 months. This agenda comes as Latin America seems to be embarking on an about-
face with regard to its record over the past 28 years, since the start of the Third Wave of democracy. 
Today the region is living in a situation that blends good news and bad news, although in a context 
in which moderate optimism prevails, due in part to strong macro-economic factors.  
 
                                                 
* Regional Director for Latin America, IDEA Internacional 
* The author would like to thank Norma Domínguez, Ileana Aguilar and Steffan Gómez for their invaluable help in 
preparing this article.  
1 Julio Burdman and Daniel Zovatto, ‘Latin American Electoral Analysis 2003-2004’, in C. Malamud and P. Isbell, 
Anuario Elcano, Latin America 2004-2005, Elcano Royal Institute, October 2005. 
2 Although they are not addressed in this study, concurrent municipal elections were also held in Honduras, El 
Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Mexico and Nicaragua. Brazil staged regional elections, and in Costa Rica, 
Paraguay and Peru non-concurrent municipal elections were held. 
3 In the Caribbean, general elections were held in St. Vincent and the Grenadines (7/12/2005 and Guyana (28/8/2006). 
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Highlights of the good news include four years of economic growth averaging more than 4% 
annually, progress in some social areas and continuity of the democratic process, despite its 
shortcomings. On the down side one observes a crisis of credibility affecting politics, parties and 
parliaments; inequity in the distribution of wealth and social exclusion; persistent poverty which 
still affects approximately 40% of the population despite all the economic growth, and finally, 
although no less important, a surge of new nationalism and populism. Within this complex and 
volatile context we will carry out a detailed analysis of the elections held from November 2005 to 
December 2006, examining their socioeconomic, political and cultural dimensions as well as the 
culture of democracy in these countries.  
 
Table 1. Latin American electoral calendar 2005-2006 a (in chronological order) 
Country Date of Elections Type of elections 
Honduras 27 November, 2005 Presidential, legislative and municipal 
Venezuela 4 December, 2005 Legislative 
Chile – first round 11 December, 2005 Presidential and legislative 
Bolivia 18 December, 2005  Presidential and legislative 
Chile – second round 15 January, 2006 Presidential run-off 
Costa Rica 5 February, 2006 Presidential and legislative 
Colombia 12 March, 2006 Legislative 
El Salvador 12 March, 2006 Deputies (mid-term) and Municipal Councils 
Peru – first round 9 April, 2006 Presidential and legislative 
Peru – second round 4 June, 2006 Presidential run-off 
Dominican Republic 16 May, 2006 Legislative (mid-term) and Municipal 
Colombia 28 May, 2006 Presidential 
Mexico 2 July, 2006 Presidential, legislative, regional and local 
Bolivia 2 July, 2006 Regional referendum and Constituent Assembly 
Brazil – first round 1 October, 2006  Presidential, legislative and regional 
Ecuador – first round 15 October, 2006  Presidential and legislative 
Panama 22 October, 2006 Referendum on Panama Canal 
Brazil – second round 29 October, 2006  Presidential runoff 
Ecuador – second round 26 November, 2006 Presidential runoff 
Nicaragua  5 November, 2006 Presidential, legislative and municipal 
Venezuela 3 December, 2006 Presidential 
a Includes presidential elections in Honduras (11/2005), Chile (12/2005) and Bolivia (12/2005) legislative voting in Venezuela (12/2005). 
Although not addressed in this essay, during the period under study municipal elections were held in Costa Rica, Paraguay and Peru. 
Source: the author. 
 
Socioeconomic context 
Latin America is the only region of the world that combines democratically elected regimes in all of 
its countries (except Cuba) with high levels of poverty (40%) and the planet’s most unproportional 
sharing-out of wealth. Meanwhile, any analysis of the region must take into account its structural 
heterogeneity because this operates on at least three levels: economic, political and social.4 On the 
economic front, some countries (and some areas within countries) have transformed into engines of 
deregulation, economic vibrance and improvement in living standards. The axes or poles of 
development, such as Buenos Aires, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Santiago, São Paulo, the north of 
Mexico and the central region of Costa Rica are examples of this strength. On the other hand, other 
areas (some Andean countries, Central America and part of the Caribbean) are saddled with low 
levels of growth, stagnation in social conditions and severe political instability. A third group of 
countries display characteristics similar to those of failed States, or endemic political and social 
crises with scant prospects for resolution. Haiti is the clearest example, but not the only one.  
 
In terms of economics Latin America is better off than it has been in three decades. In 2004 the 
economy grew 5.9%, its best showing of the past 20 years. The growth rate was 4.5% in 2005 and 
5.3% in 2006. Growth for 2007 is forecast by CEPAL5 as approaching 4.7%. Thanks to this 
                                                 
4 Daniel Zovatto, ‘Regional agendas in scenarios of conflict in Latin America at the start of the 21st century’, opening 
lecture of the National Congress of the Argentine Society for Political Analysis, Córdoba, 15/XI/2005. 
5 CEPAL, Preliminary results for the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2006, 
www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/2/27542/lcg2327_p_e_capIV.pdf  
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economic performance, rates of poverty and indigence – in 2005 they stood at 39.8% and 15.4% 
respectively – are expected to fall to 38.5% and 14.7% by the end of 2007, their lowest levels in the 
past 25 years.6 However, Latin America has more economic inequality than any other region of the 
world. According to the Human Development Report 2005, prepared by the UNDP, the Gini 
coefficient (which measures inequality) of the region is 0.571, whereas for the countries of the 
OECD it is 0.368. Although in some countries (Colombia, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico 
and Uruguay) the Gini coefficient fell between 1990 y 2002, in most cases it rose.7 
 
Political context 
Important differences among the countries of the region are also observed in the political realm. 
Although as a region Latin America is significantly better off than it was 28 years ago, (when the 
Third Wave began), this positive trend is not uniform. While some countries are making major 
progress in democratization, others seem to have stagnated after taking an initial step forward and a 
third group is showing a clear decline. This observation coincides with the Democratic 
Development Index (DDI) devised by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and Polilat. The index 
seeks to measure the democratic behaviour of the 18 countries of Latin America. For the year 2006 
the DDI value was 5.063, which denotes an average level of democratic development albeit with a 
slight increase over the previous year (4.842). A breakdown analysis of DDI values shows only six 
countries above average: three with high levels of democratic development (Chile, Costa Rica and 
Uruguay) with scores above 7.51, and three others with an average development level: Argentina, 
Mexico and Panama, with scores above 5. The 12 remaining countries of Latin America posted 
figures below 5 and this classifies them as nations with low democratic development (El Salvador, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, the 
Dominican Republic and Venezuela). 
 
Table 2. Democratic Development Indices in Latin America 
Country Score 
Chile 10.796 
Costa Rica 9.704 
Uruguay 8.397 
Panama 6.828 
Mexico 5.917 
Argentina 5,330 
El Salvador 4.718 
Brazil 4.468 
Honduras 4.431 
Dominican Republic 4.187 
Colombia 4.362 
Paraguay 3.745 
Guatemala 3.834 
Peru  3.590 
Nicaragua 3.151 
Venezuela 2.720 
Bolivia 2.726 
Ecuador 2.237 
Source: Konrad Adenauer and Polilat, http://www.idd-lat.org/Edicion%202006.htm 
 
According to the Index of Democracy devised by The Economist,8 countries can be classified by 
four types of regime depending on their level of democratic development: (1) complete 
                                                 
6  CEPAL, Social Outlook of Latin America, 2006: 
www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/0/27480/PSE2006_Sintesis_Lanzamiento.pdf  
7 Fernando Calderón, ‘Electoral Outlook in Latin America: what will replace the neoliberal model?’, Nueva Sociedad, 
Buenos Aires (III/2006). 
8  The Economist, The Economist intelligence unit’s index of democracy: 
www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf  
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democracies; (2) imperfect democracies; (3) hybrid regimes; and (4) authoritarian regimes. The 
distribution by region shows that Latin America, Eastern Europe and to a lesser extent Asia are 
home to the largest number of imperfect democracies. The analysis also shows that, despite Latin 
America’s progress in democratization in recent decades, many countries still have fragile 
democracies. In these countries, electoral turnout is generally low and the culture of democracy is 
weak; one observes the phenomenon of political ‘caudillos’ or bosses. In recent years there have 
been significant declines in some areas, such as freedom of the press. 
 
Observing the distribution of countries in the Index of Democracy, one sees that only two countries 
of Latin America have complete democracies – Costa Rica and Uruguay – while most (13 of 18) 
amount to imperfect democracies. This group is made up of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and the Dominican 
Republic. Three others countries have hybrid regimes: Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela. Cuba, 
according to the rating of The Economist, is the only country of the region with an authoritarian 
regime. Comparing regional averages one sees that Latin America is in third place in the index 
ranking, below North America and Western Europe, and above the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, Asia 
and Australasia, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa. 
 
Table 3. Index of Democracy. The Economist 
 Average Index of Democracy 
Number of 
countries 
Complete 
democracies 
Imperfect 
Democracies 
Hybrid 
regimes 
Authoritarian 
regimes 
North America 8.64 2 2 0 0 0 
Western Europe 8.60 21 18 2 1 0 
Latin America  6.55 18 2 13 3 0 
Caribbean 5.81 6 0 4 1 1 
Eastern Europe 5.76 28 2 14 6 6 
Asia and Australasia 5.44 28 3 12 4 9 
Subsaharan Africa  4.24 44 1 7 13 23 
Middle East and North 
Africa 3.53 20 0 2 2 16 
Total 5.52 167 28 54 30 55 
Source: the author, based on ‘The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2006’  
 
The Freedom House Index, which measures levels of freedom by evaluating political liberties and 
civil rights in each country, defined three categories: countries that are free, partially free or not 
free. The first group includes those cases in which there is an atmosphere of open political 
competition, respect for civil liberties and independent media. Partially free countries are 
characterized by limits to citizens’ civil liberties and political rights, often beset with corruption, a 
weak system of rule of law and a dominant political party that hampers political plurality. Finally, 
the group of countries that are not free includes those in which there is a lack of civil liberties and 
citizens’ political rights are denied.  
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Table 4. Freedom House Index Latin America, 2006 
Country Political  Rights 
Civil 
Liberties 
Level of   
Freedoms 
Argentina 2 2 Free 
Bolivia 3 3 Partially Free 
Brazil 2 2 Free 
Chile 1 1 Free 
Colombia 3 3 Partially Free 
Costa Rica 1 1 Free 
Ecuador 3 3 Partially Free 
El Salvador 2 3 Free 
Guatemala 3▲ 4 Partially Free 
Honduras 3 3 Partially Free 
Mexico 2 3▼ Free 
Nicaragua 3 3 Partially Free 
Panama 1 2 Free 
Paraguay 3 3 Partially Free 
Peru 2 3 Free 
Dominican Republic 2 2 Free 
Uruguay 1 1 Free 
Venezuela 4 4 Partially Free 
Note: The index is a scale running from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of freedom and 7 the lowest. This index covers the 
period from 1/12/2005 to 31/12/2006. 
▲▼ Arrows indicate a change in political rights or civil liberties compared to the previous measurement. 
Source: Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_release/fiw07_overview_final.pdf  
 
According to the Freedom House classification, 10 of the 18 countries of the region are free. The 
remaining eight (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and 
Venezuela) are partially free. If we include Cuba and Haiti, the former is the only country of the 
region that is not free. Haiti is partially free and has shown improvement in respect for civil liberties 
and political rights in comparison with previous evaluations. 
 
On the other hand, democracy in Latin America is combined with high levels of violence and 
internal conflicts. Until not long ago, the region could be described as a set of violent societies with 
relatively peaceful States. However, the deepening of new kinds of regional, intra-regional, ethnic 
and cultural conflicts, such as those seen in recent years in Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico or Peru, 
among others, show that the subcontinent is not completely free of renewed forms of inter-state or 
sub-national conflict, nor of ‘tribal’ fragmentation like that seen in sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans 
or the Caucasus. 
 
In doing this electoral analysis, another point that requires our attention is that of indigenous 
demands: their clearest exponent is Evo Morales, Bolivia’s first indigenous president. It is 
important not to confuse or automatically associate being indigenous with being nationalist – a 
trend that is in fashion in some countries – because the two concepts are not interchangeable. In this 
sense, indigenous claims do not always come with territorial demands, as shown in the case of 
Bolivia, where the demands of the civil committees that make up the ‘half moon’ focus on 
autonomy and territory, which clashes with indigenous demands. There is no indigenous movement 
with strength comparable to those in Bolivia, Peru or Ecuador, where although there are large and 
numerous ethnic groups, the Pachakuti movement won only 2.19% of the votes in the election held 
in October 2006. In Peru, indigenous power was subsumed by the broader political movement that 
supported Ollanta Humala, a clear advocate of nationalism. 
 
Meanwhile, the crisis of institutions as channels for social demands has led to a proliferation and 
crystallization of these demands in horizontal protest movements that do not join the political 
system in a vertical fashion. The movements of the ‘piqueteros’ in Argentina, the landless ‘Sin 
Tierra’ in Brazil, the Zapatistas in Mexico (at least in their initial phases) and many others in the 
majority of countries are clear manifestations of this tendency. Purely individual channelling of 
social demands through institutions is being replaced by a gradual process of mobilization and 
politicizing of civil society, one of the main challenges for the region’s democratic future.  
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To sum up, and without ignoring important differences between countries, the problems at hand can 
be separated into three categories that are closely linked: (1) growth and employment: it defines the 
need to achieve high and sustained levels of growth and create quality jobs; (2) inequity and 
poverty: it addresses the tasks of reducing high levels of poverty and achieving greater levels of 
social cohesion in a region characterized by being the most inequitable in the world; and (3) 
political-institutional: it refers to the need to rebuild institutions and restore the State in new 
frameworks  of globalization. With this assortment of economic, social and political-institutional 
problems, as Fernando Calderón9 notes, the question that served as the backdrop for the electoral 
calendar for 2005-06 is this: What model can replace the neo-liberal one, which appears to have run 
its course? 
 
The responses range from the most conservative ones – linked to the war on terrorism and free 
market economics – proposed by the US to more radical leftist ideas related to the government of 
Venezuela. In this sense Calderón argues that one can define four axes of political orientation: (1) 
the first, set by Washington, establishes a norm based on its fight against terrorism and the logic of 
a ‘pre-emptive war.’ Within this ideology the United Status coincides with several governments, 
like that of Colombia, many of the governments of Central America and that of Mexico, which 
advocate proposals based on free market economics. They are associated with traditional values and 
the building of solid, neo-liberal democracies; (2) the second, defined by countries such Brazil and 
Chile, along with their allies Argentina and Uruguay, and more recently Peru, has developed centre-
left ideas, with thinking that is more geared toward redistributing wealth but with market realism in 
the economic sphere; (3) the third axis is that of Venezuela and its new Bolivarian movement, 
which looks to spread to other countries; and (4) finally, the indigenous axis which brings together 
both Bolivarian and Mercosur-type proposals. Bolivia, where the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) 
won the elections, is the best example. Ecuador and Guatemala might also be receptive to these 
ideas, but they have yet to take root.  
 
Political culture: citizens’ opinion 
The socio-economic context we have described – significant but insufficient economic growth, high 
levels of poverty and inequality – and the problems with ability to govern tend to fuel each other, 
generating a vicious cycle of institutional weakness, lack of competitiveness and high levels of 
political instability. This saps the levels of legitimacy of democracy and its institutions, living rise 
to crises of representation and ability to govern. Experience shows that levels of satisfaction with 
democracy vary over time and are more vulnerable to changes in economic conditions. Sometime 
economic growth increases rather than eases discontent. For instance, Chile’s robust surplus in 
2006 triggered claims and protests, as some sectors of society felt there had not been a fair 
distribution of that unexpected windfall.  
 
Citizens’ support for democracy10 (with respect to the ideal and the form of democratic 
government) differs from the degree of satisfaction with the way it works, and although we detect 
an acceptable level of support for democracy (58%) and a strong majority of people see it as the 
best system of government despite its problems (74%), only a small percentage of people say they 
are satisfied with the way it works (38%). This is explained in part by people’s perceptions of the 
economy: even though macroeconomic indicators show an improvement over past years, this had 
not influenced Latin Americans’ perception of democracy and their expectations for economic 
development. There are also contradictory opinions because the data on citizens’ perceptions of the 
economic situation of a country, while not terribly flattering, show a significant recovery. In 2004, 
while 8% of Latin Americans saw the economic situation in their country as good, in 2005 the 
figure rose to 11% and in 2006 it increased to 18%. 
 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Figures from the Latinobarómetro 2006, en www.latinobarometro.org  
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Although democracy enjoys widespread support in the region (58%), Latin Americans are very 
critical of their institutions of political representation. The data show low trust in congress (27%) 
and political parties (22%), although a majority feels there can be no democracy without these 
institutions (58% for the parties and 55% for the congress). And as we will see further on, there is a 
worrisome loss of confidence in the electoral process, as only 57% believe in voting as a vehicle for 
changing things and only 41% think elections are clean.  
 
Table 5. Latin American public opinion on democracy and its institutions and economic expectations (1996-2006) 
(percentage figures) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average 
Democracy             
Support 61 62 62 60 60 48 56 53 53 53 58 56.9 
Satisfaction 27 41 37 37 37 25 32 28 29 31 38 32.9 
Trust             
Political 
Parties 20 28 21 20 20 19 14 11 18 19 22 .3 
Congress 27 36 27 28 28 24 23 17 24 28 27 26.3 
Economy             
Current 
Economic 
Expectationsa 
8 10 8 8 8 7 8 7 8 11 18 9.2 
a Based on the question: How would you rate the current economic situation and that of your family? Here those who responded are 
taken into account: ‘very good’ and ‘good’. 
Source: Corporación Latinobarómetro. 
 
Citizens’ opinion: the context of the elections 
The context of this burst of electoral activity is characterized by attitudes and perceptions that 
favour the stability of the democratic regime (a clean electoral process, support for democracy and 
high percentages of voter intention) and significant levels of discontent with the performance of 
political leaders and institutions of representation (political parties and Congress.) In this sense, as 
we explain later, the first impact of these elections was their effect on voter intentions, inverting the 
trend observed since 2000, in which most people said they would not vote for a party. In the period 
2005-2006, the proportion of people who would vote for a party rose from 49 to 53%. At the same 
time there was a decline from 51 to 47% in the segment of people who said they would not vote for 
a party.   
 
Another variable that marked the context of the elections is the efficiency of the vote. This allows 
one to analyze the legitimacy of democracy in terms of the power of voter sovereignty. A total of 
57% of Latin Americans say voting ‘to elect those who advocate my position is the most effective 
way of changing things.’ In the same sense, 19% say it is impossible to have an influence for things 
to change, no matter what one does, and 14% say the most effective tool is to take part in protest 
movements and demand changes directly.  
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Graph 1. 
 
 
An analysis by countries shows that in Paraguay (39%) there exists the weakest perception of the 
efficiency of voting. There, 20% of those polled also said elections were clean (the last ones were 
held in 2003) and 31% said there was fraud. The countries of Latin America where people have the 
strongest perception of the efficiency of voting are Venezuela and Uruguay, both with 71%, and 
Nicaragua and Argentina with 69%. 
 
Trends 
 
Between November 2005 and December 2006 the region went through its most important electoral 
period of the last 28 years, a period characterized by a major reconfiguration of the regional 
political scene. As we have stated, these elections came in a regional context of moderate optimism, 
despite the democratic process’s shortcomings and the challenges it faces. This optimism stems 
from the currently strong macroeconomic conditions in Latin America. These in turn coincides with 
a rise in support for and satisfaction with democracy, and with the fact that no president has had to 
leave his position ahead of schedule. All of this is added to the importance of elections as the 
mechanism for choosing legitimate rulers and resolving differences democratically. With this 
panorama as a backdrop, an analysis of the main features and results of this electoral period allows 
once to identify the following trends. 
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Graph 2. 
 
 
The region’s alleged shift to the left 
Election results in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela led many observers and analysts to 
conclude the region had taken a turn to the left. The question of whether Latin America had shifted 
to the left, and, if it had, what exactly the word ‘left’ meant – an issue that had been under debate 
for some time – took on  new importance at the end of 2005 with the victory by Evo Morales and in 
early 2006 with the triumph of Concertación in Chile. The possibility of other leftist wins in 2006 -- 
Ollanta Humala in Peru and Andrés Manuel López Obrador en México—the re-election of Lula and 
the return to power by Daniel Ortega, or the triumph of Rafael Correa in Ecuador and the re-
election of Hugo Chávez fuelled an erroneous perception that the facts themselves and a more 
careful reading of events in the region would debunk. At no point was it specified what left had 
triumphed, nor was it acknowledged that differences among all these ‘leftist’ governments and 
candidates were sometimes greater than the similarities.11 
 
There is no doubt that political and electoral processes in Latin America have an influence on each 
other, but there is no consensus on how. so-called contagion effects are not pure, and the shift to the 
left or the indigenous effect do not occur everywhere. Thus, the ‘Chávez effect’ that people talked 
about so much and continue to talk about, did favour Morales, Correa and Ortega but it had the 
opposite effect with Humala and López Obrador. 
 
                                                 
11  Manuel Alcántara says the ‘heterogeneous rise of leftist parties’ in Latin America is characterized by the fact that 
these parties exhibit more differences than similarities. On the other hand, the region’s institutional design is based a 
presidential system, while for a president to fulfil his or her electoral  platform they need a strong and stable majority in 
parliament. This is the case in Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay and Venezuela, but not in Brazil and Chile. In these two 
countries the presidents are clearly leftists and belong to the 70-year-old Socialist Party of Chile or Brazil’s Workers 
Party, which has been around for a quarter century. The presidents lack single-party governments and a majority in 
congress, so many times decisions are taken that do no reflect the presidential agenda. ‘The Latin American Electoral 
Carrousel’, Bitácora Almendrón, Madrid, 14/8/2006.  www.almendron.com/tribuna/?p=11047 
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The premise that Latin America was making a ‘shift to the left’ began to fall apart with the elections 
in Honduras (November 2005), Costa Rica (February) and Colombia (May). In these three 
presidential elections, neo-liberal political forces of the centre or the right were the winners. Shortly 
thereafter, the successive defeats of Humala and López Obrador strengthened the perception that, 
rather than a shift to the left, what was happening was, as Costa Rican president Oscar Arias said, a 
turn to the centre, toward democracy. It was a turn toward moderation in the face of the excesses of 
neo-liberal policies that for most people failed to generate prosperity.12 Julio María Sanguinetti 
expressed a similar opinion: 
 
More than a shift to the left, what we are witnessing is a laborious, contradictory and relentless 
movement of the left toward the centre. Even traditional leftist parties such as the Brazilian PT or 
the Frente Amplio in Uruguay have been abandoning long-standing ideals. They call themselves 
friends of Fidel and seek out his friendly embrace in order to appease old comrades pressing them 
to settle debts for all those years of hard-left support. But it stops there: it is good for getting your 
picture taken but not for imitating.   
 
And on the case of Chile he adds: 
 
For starters let’s rule out Chile [as being on the left], a country governed by a centrist coalition 
comprising the European-style socialism of Ricardo Lagos and historic Christian Democrats. The 
fact that Mrs. Bachelet has a socialist background does not change the nature of the government, 
which will follow the parameters of its predecessors, with the region’s most open economy, 
integrated in a globalized world through free-trade treaties with everyone from the United Status to 
China.13 
 
Alain Touraine does not think the region is shifting to the left, either. He says it is not useful to use 
expressions invented for a different context. The language that corresponds to a parliamentary 
system by nature works poorly for a presidential or semi-presidential system. The hypothesis that 
should be formulated is that the continent is drifting further away from a model which, while if it 
may not be parliamentarian, is at least based on mechanisms of different interests and ideologies 
opposing each other. Latin America seems further from finding a political expression for its social 
problems than it did 30 years ago. Herein lies the main point: it is what is at stake and therein lies 
the failure. Touraine concludes that: 
 
Political events … in several countries of the continent do not encourage… the idea of a general 
movement to the left. Once again the … opposite conclusion prevails: the deep and lasting failure 
of a vigorous social democracy. In this sense, clearly the question one must address today is the 
appropriateness of the new policy of rupture inspired by Fidel Castro and represented by 
Venezuela. In the face of this model, Hugo Chávez holds the opportunities of political and social 
voluntarism that is much more radical, in particular in contrast with the countries of the Southern 
Cone. 14 
 
Given the different sources of thought cited here, I agree with the opinion that the interpretation of 
what is happening in the region has been superficial, hasty and simplistic. As Rojas Aravena says: 
‘Left and right, in this day and age, do not reflect the essential identities of the new leaders, nor do 
                                                 
12 Oscar Arias Sánchez, ‘Latin America’s shift to the centre’, The Washington Post, Washington, 15/3/2006: 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/14/AR2006031401114.html 
13 Julio María Sanguinetti, ‘A leftist wave spreads across Latin America’, 24/3/2006: 
www.correoperu.com.pe/correosur/cusco/columnista.php?col_id=17 
14 Alain Touraine and E. Laclau, ‘America in times of Chávez’, Page/12, 8/10/2006. 
www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-74196-2006-10-08.html  
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they represent the changes that are taking place in the world.’15 The debate on what the term ‘left’ 
means is not exclusive to our region, but rather extends to Europe, as Ulrico Beck states when he 
talks (in the European context) of four ways of being leftist: protectionist, neo-liberal (Third Way), 
one who lives enclosed within a citadel, and the cosmopolitan leftist.16 We feel there is no solid 
evidence that the region is taking a turn to the left. Dividing politics into right and left, besides 
being out of sync in terms of time, causes more confusion than clarity. As former president Ricardo 
Lagos said, rather than a shift to the left, the region is undergoing a deepening of the democratic 
system. Voters are seeking options that will help them fix unresolved problems. Rosendo Fraga 
says it this way: 
 
In political terms, 2006 was a year of presidential elections in which 85% of the region voted and 
there was an ideological shift toward the centre, with three clearly defined lines: Social Democrat, 
populist left and centre-right. The re-election of Lula in Brazil and the election of Bachelet in Chile 
confirmed the existence of a Social Democratic axis which Uruguay also joined. Meanwhile, the 
Bolivarian Alliance of  the Americas (ALBA), founded by Venezuela and Cuba, incorporated 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua, although the new president of the latter (Ortega) announced he 
will not abandon the free-trade accord that Central America and Santo Domingo signed with the 
US. At the same time, a third centre-right force emerged unexpectedly with the triumphs of 
Calderón in Mexico and Alan García in Peru – with its new turn in this direction - which, along 
with Colombia and the majority of the countries in Central America constitute an axis with a coast 
overlooking the Pacific, close to Washington in political terms.17 
 
According to the argument expressed by former president Lagos, Latin America is approaching a 
new era. Whereas before the goal was to grow (and this is being done nicely) now the priority is to 
define what model of society we want to build. So, rather than a shift to the left, it is more accurate 
and correct to speak of a search for new options in the framework of a deepening of democracy. It 
is a democracy which in some cases can have an authoritarian or plebiscitary slant, with strong 
populist components and objectives that are a bit all-encompassing. 
 
The electoral system: run-offs and concurrent elections 
During the period under study, much use was made of the run-off mechanism for electing 
presidents. There are opinions for and against this system. Its defenders point to two fundamental 
advantages: 1) it is said to strengthen the electoral legitimacy of the president, not only because it 
guarantees this person has broken through a minimum electoral threshold but also because it allows 
the electorate to decide the race in the event no candidate surpasses that threshold in the first round 
of voting; 2) as a result of this first point, the system would tend to strengthen democratic 
governance by guaranteeing election of a president with broad popular support and promoting 
electoral coalitions between the first and second rounds that can easily turn later into governing 
coalitions.  
 
Critics of the run-off system argue that the second round hardly ever lives up to these promises. 
They say that first of all, the alleged legitimacy stemming from broad electoral support can be 
artificial and unstable. On the other hand, critics say the second round generates fewer incentives 
for strategic voting: voters can cast ballots for their favourite candidate in the first round, albeit with 
scant probability of victory, without worrying too much about an undesired candidate winning 
because in the mind of the voter this is put off until the second round. According to this argument, 
the two-round system favours an increase in the number of parties, a process which over the long 
term will tend to fragment the electorate. Despite this debate, the two-round voting system has been 
incorporated into the legislation of most of the countries of the region. Thirteen countries use it, 
                                                 
15 Francisco Rojas Aravena, ‘The new Latin American political map. Rethinking the factors that mark political trenes’, 
Nueva Sociedad, Buenos Aires, 2005, p. 125. 
16 Ulrich Beck, El País, Madrid, 17/11/2006, p. 13. 
17 Rosendo Fraga, ‘Three trends in the region’, La Nación, Buenos Aires, 17/1/2007, p. 3. 
 12
although with important differences in how: Argentina, Bolivia,18 Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay. 
The ones that do not have it are Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela. 
 
Of the 11 presidential elections that were held during the period under study, eight were conducted 
with the two-round system. Of these, in half the cases a run-off was needed (Brazil, Ecuador, Chile 
and Peru) while in the other four a winner emerged in the first round of voting (Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Colombia and Nicaragua). In the cases of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, the electoral system stipulates 
reduced margins for winning in the first round (40% of the votes in both cases, or in the case of 
Nicaragua 35% with a margin off 5% over the person in second place), which facilitated the victory 
of Arias and Ortega in the first round. Otherwise, had a classical two-round system been in place 
(winner needs 50 percent plus one vote) in both countries there would have been a run-off election. 
 
As observed in Table 6, of the four cases in which it was necessary to go to a second round, in two 
of them the final result went against the first-place finisher of the first round. In Peru, the candidate 
who finished second in the first round, (Alan García) ended up winning, and the same thing 
happened in Ecuador, where Rafael Correa triumphed over Álvaro Noboa, who had won the first 
round of the election.  
 
As for the nature of concurrent or off-year legislative elections, it is worth pointing out that in the 
vast majority of the presidential elections, legislative voting was held at the same time. In nine 
countries the legislative and presidential elections were simultaneous. The only countries that did 
not hold concurrent elections were Colombia (it held them two months before the presidential 
voting, a typical case of what are known as semi-concurrent elections) and Venezuela (in December 
2005). 
 
Table 6. Latin American voting systems in elections of 2005-2006 
Election result 2005-2006 Country Electoral system First round Second round 
Bolivia  Two rounds, with majority Evo Morales — 
Brazil Two rounds, with majority 1. Luiz Inácio da Silva 2. Geraldo Alckmin Luiz Inácio da Silva 
Chile  Two rounds, with majority 1. Michelle Bachelet 2. Sebastián Piñera Michelle Bachelet 
Colombia  Two rounds, with majority Álvaro Uribe — 
Peru Two rounds, with majority 1. Ollanta Humala 2. Alan García Alan García 
Costa Rica  Two rounds, with reduced threshold Oscar Arias — 
Ecuador  Two rounds, with reduced threshold 
1. Álvaro Noboa 
2. Rafael Correa Rafael Correa 
Nicaragua  Two rounds, with reduced threshold Daniel Ortega — 
Honduras  Simple majority Manuel Zelaya n/a 
Mexico Simple majority Felipe Calderón n/a 
Venezuela  Simple majority Hugo Chávez n/a 
n/a: not applicable 
Source: the author 
 
                                                 
18  In Bolivia, the second round is held in Congress. This is done if no candidate wins an absolute majority in the first 
round. The second round in the legislature requires an absolute majority of the lawmakers present in order to elect a 
new president. 
 13
Table 7. Latin America: Concurrence of presidential and legislative elections 
Country Presidential and legislative elections Result in Congress  
Bolivia  Concurrent The president-elect’s party won, with a majority in the lower house but not in the Senate.  
Brazil Concurrent The president-elect’s party won, but without a majority in both houses.  
Chile  Concurrent The president-elect’s party won, with a majority in both houses. 
Costa Rica  Concurrent The president-elect’s party won, but without a legislative majority. 
Ecuador  Concurrent The president-elect’s party lost, no legislative majority.  
Honduras  Concurrent The president-elect’s party won, no legislative majority.  
Mexico Concurrent The president-elect’s party won, no legislative majority.  
Nicaragua  Concurrent The president-elect’s party won, no legislative majority. 
Peru Concurrent The president’s party lost, no majority. 
Source: the author 
 
In seven of the concurrent elections, the results of the presidential election carried over into the 
legislative voting, although in a limited fashion. In five of these seven cases (Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua), the party of the president failed to achieve an absolute majority 
in Congress. In two cases (Bolivia and Chile) the carry-over effect was greater, as in Chile the 
Concertación party mustered a majority in both chambers, while in Bolivia the MAS party won an 
absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies but not in the Senate. In two cases, Ecuador and Peru, 
the president-elect’s party did not finish first in the concurrent legislative elections. In Peru, first 
place went to Ollanta Humala (UP) and in Ecuador it was Álvaro Noboa (PRIAN). In the latter, it 
must be noted that president Correa does not have representatives in Congress as a result of his 
decision not to field candidates. 
 
Ability to govern 
All the governments of the region feature presidential-style regimes (although with important 
differences among them) and most of the countries have multi-party systems. So relations between 
the executive and legislative branches are key to whether things work or stagnate. It is important to 
note if the results of these elections yielded presidents with a majority in the legislature or ‘divided’ 
governments. To a large extent this determines the new governments’ margin for manoeuvring and 
acting, in particular with respect to its ability to govern. Latin American presidential systems rely 
on support from a majority in the legislature (that of the president’s party) or a coalition. The 
existence of countries that are socially and politically fragmented makes it more difficult to form 
majorities that support and strengthen the ability to govern.  
 
The election results revealed difficulties to form political majorities. Of the 11 presidents elected, 
only four have a majority on their own: Morales (only in the Chamber of Deputies), Bachelet, Uribe 
and Chávez. In the other seven countries (Brazil, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua and Peru), the president will have to seek out agreements – either on a case-by-case basis 
or, preferably, with a broader scope – to carry out the government’s agenda and avoid the paralysis 
that tends to dog presidents who rule with ‘divided’ governments. This is the case of the president 
of El Salvador, Antonio Saca, who won the last mid-term election but failed to garner an absolute 
majority. On the other hand, President Leonel Fernández of the Dominican Republic did win a 
majority (in both chambers in mid-term elections.) 
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The results: continuity or change 
A review of the electoral results examining where there has been continuity or change – from a 
general point of view that takes in not just presidential elections but also legislative voting, 
referendums and constituent assemblies – shows that ruling parties have done well, to a large extent 
because macroeconomic figures for the regional economy are good. A comparative analysis shows 
that ruling parties were returned to power in five countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and 
Venezuela, while the opposition triumphed in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua 
and Peru. Three of the five ruling-party victories were consecutive re-elections (Brazil, Colombia 
and Venezuela). In Chile, the Concertación party won again (for the fourth straight time since 
democracy was restored in 1990) and in Mexico it was the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) that 
stayed in power. 
 
In evaluating the opposition wins, we must keep in mind that in two of these countries there were 
transitional presidents (Bolivia and Ecuador); in a third, the party of the acting president did not 
field a candidate for president (Peru) and that in a fourth country the ruling party was deeply 
divided as it took part in the elections (Nicaragua). Then there is Costa Rica, where corruption 
scandals that affected  two ex-presidents of the ruling party (Partido Unidad Social Cristiana –
PUSC-), added to the fact that this party has been in power 12 of the last 16 years, combined to give 
the party the worst electoral drubbing of its history.  
 
Table 8. Latin America: ability to govern of parties that won elections in 2005-2006 
Winning party’s ability to govern Country Lower chamber Upper chamber 
Bolivia  Majority No majority 
Brazil No majority No majority 
Chile  Majority Majority 
Colombia  Majority Majority 
Costa Rica  No majority n/a 
Ecuador No majority a n/a 
El Salvador No majority n/a 
Honduras  No majority n/a 
Mexico No majority No majority 
Nicaragua  No majority n/a 
Peru No majority n/a 
Dominican 
Republic Majority Majority 
Venezuela  Majority n/a 
a The alliance led by president-elect Rafael Correa did not field candidates for parliament.  
n/a: Not applicable 
Source: the author 
 
Table 9. Latin America: Continuity or change in the Executive Branch. Elections 2005-2006 
Country Executive branch Continuity vs. change 
Bolivia  Change 
Brazil Continuity 
Chile  Continuity 
Colombia  Continuity  
Costa Rica  Change 
Ecuador  Change 
Honduras  Change 
Mexico Continuity 
Nicaragua  Change 
Peru Change 
Venezuela  Continuity 
Source: the author. 
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Besides their strong showing in the presidential elections, ruling parties won all the non-concurrent 
legislative elections in Colombia and Venezuela, and the mid-term elections in El Salvador and the 
Dominican Republic. As for direct democracy, ruling parties were the clear victors in all the 
referendums held. The first was in Bolivia, with the Autonomy Referendum of July 2, in which the 
‘no’ vote (encouraged by the government) won 57% of the votes compared to 42% for the ‘yes.’ 
The second was the referendum held in Panama on Oct. 22 on whether to enlarge the canal. This 
time the ‘yes’ vote (supported by the government) won 77.8% of the votes and the ‘no’ vote 22.2%. 
Another important event was Bolivia’s election of delegates to a constituent assembly on July 2, 
and here, too, the ruling party won the most seats.   
 
Re-election fever  
Latin America is living a re-election fever with two forms: immediate and alternating. In seven of 
the presidential elections held, candidates ran for re-election: Brazil, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Colombia, 
Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela. Of these, four were cases of leaders seeking to return after having 
left the presidency and three were sitting presidents seeking another term. The former were in 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Peru. With the exception of former president Jorge Quiroga in 
Bolivia, the other ex-presidents managed to win re-election (Arias, Ortega and García). In the three 
cases of immediate re-election -- Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela – all three presidents won 
another term (Lula, Uribe and Chávez). 
 
Table 10. Latin America: Re-election of presidents in 2005-2006 
Country Re-election Candidates in elections 2005-2006 Election result 
Bolivia  Not immediate Jorge Quiroga Not re-elected 
Brazil Immediate Luiz Inácio da Silva Re-elected 
Colombia  Immediate Álvaro Uribe Re-elected 
Costa Rica  Not immediate Oscar Arias Re-elected 
Nicaragua  Not immediate Daniel Ortega Re-elected 
Peru Not immediate Alan García Re-elected 
Venezuela  Immediate Hugo Chávez Re-elected 
Source: the author. 
 
An analysis of these data at the regional level shows that in 63% of the presidential elections, 
candidates were seeking re-election, and in 86% of the cases (6 out of 7 elections) they won. These 
results fuelled debate in the region over the pro’s and con’s of re-election. On one hand, critics 
argue that allowing leaders to be re-elected exposes the political system to the risk of becoming a 
‘democratic dictatorship’ and strengthens a trend toward the personality-based and domineering 
leadership inherent in a presidential system. These critics say that in general a president’s second 
term is of low quality. At least seven cases, from 1978 to the present, seem to confirm these 
assertions as to the dangers and defects of letting a leader be re-elected: 1) Alfredo Stroessner en 
Paraguay, who did not finish his last term as a result of a coup d’etat in 1989, although he had been 
in power since 1954, winning re-election several times; 2) Joaquín Balaguer in the Dominican 
Republic, who last term was reduced from four years to two as a result of fraud committed during 
his last re-election in 1994; 3) Alberto Fujimori en Peru, did not finish his term because his fled the 
country amid charges of fraud and corruption; 4) Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada of Bolivia, who 
resigned half-way through his second term. Also turning in mediocre second terms as president 
were: 5) Carlos Andrés Pérez, who did not complete his term in Venezuela and instead was 
dismissed 6) Rafael Caldera, also in Venezuela. To all this we add the second term of 7) Carlos 
Menem in Argentina, who did manage to complete it but did so amid economic problems, high 
unemployment and many charges of corruption.  
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Defenders of re-election, meanwhile, argue that it allows countries to apply a more ‘democratic’ 
focus by letting voters choose their president with more freedom and hold this person responsible 
for their performance, rewarding or punishing them depending on how they do. Although over the 
last quarter century in Latin America the cases of Cardoso in Brazil (immediate re-election) and 
Sanguinetti in Uruguay (not immediate) are moderately positive examples of the two kinds of re-
election, in both cases their first terms were more successful than the second ones. 
 
The re-election fever in the region means that 40% of the countries are governed by leaders who 
were re-elected. While in 2004 there was just one president re-elected in the alternating, non-
immediate fashion, (Leonel Fernández in the Dominican Republic), only two years later there are 
seven: three re-elected to immediate second terms (Chávez, Lula and Uribe) and four in the 
alternating fashion (Arias, Fernández – who might seek another term in 2008 - García and Ortega). 
Not since the return of democracy in 1978 have there been so many re-elected presidents. I believe 
that the destiny of re-election and its evolution seem more dependent than ever on the success or 
failure of this high number of re-elected presidents.  
 
Regional electoral fracture 
Another trend that emerges from the results of the various presidential elections is that of deep 
divisions between regions, with less developed ones rejecting the economic and political models in 
place. To this effect one can point out the results in Brazil and Mexico, which divided along north-
south lines; Bolivia between east and west, Ecuador between coastal, mountainous and jungle 
regions; Peru’s experience was similar to this latter case.  
 
Election turnout 
Turnout trends in the presidential elections were not consistent. In six countries (Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua)19 turnout was lower than in the last election. Worth 
pointing out are Honduras and Mexico, where turnout fell 11 and 5%, respectively. By contrast, in 
five countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) turnout rose. The biggest increases 
were in Venezuela with an 18.82% rise, and Bolivia with 12%. Average turnout in the 11 elections 
was 72.10%. If one measures the effect of these turnout figures on the Latin American average for 
presidential voting, it is slightly positive, rising from 69.94% in the period 1978-2004 to 70.18% in 
1978-2006. 
 
                                                 
19  We use the preliminary electoral turnout figure (78%), provided by Roberto Rivas, chairman of the Electoral 
Council of Nicaragua: www.rnv.gov.ve/noticias/index.php?act=ST&f=3&t=40186 
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Table 11. Latin America: Average election turnout 1978-2004 and 1978-2006 
Country Average 78-04 (%) 
Average 78-06 
(%) 
Difference 
(%) 
Argentina  81.22 81.22 — 
Bolivia  74.20 75.67 1.47 
Brazil 83.44 83.40 –0.04 
Chile  91.71 90.70 –1.01 
Colombia  44.45 44.53 0.08 
Costa Rica  78.08 76.47 –1.61 
Ecuador  72.35 72.33 –0.02 
El Salvador  51.70 51.70 — 
Guatemala  55.01 55.01 — 
Honduras  73.57 70.93 –2.64 
Mexico 71.25 67.02 –4.23 
Nicaragua a 80.67 80.01 –0.66 
Panama 72.70 72.70 — 
Paraguay  67.06 67.06 — 
Peru 81.68 82.69 1.01 
Uruguay  88.61 88.61 — 
Venezuela b 72.51 72.78 0.27 
LATIN AMERICA  69.94 70.18 0.24 
a Based on preliminary turnout figure for presidential election of 2006, as provided by the Electoral Council of Nicaragua. 
b Based on preliminary data for turnout in presidential election of 2006, as provided by the National Electoral Council of Venezuela, with 
98.29% of the records examined. 
Source: the author. 
 
There is no clear downward trend in turnout in presidential elections in the region. This is because a 
large rise in abstention in several countries was offset by an increase in turnout in others, mainly in 
the Andean region, and in particular Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador. Table 12 shows turnout 
percentages for the region.  
 
However, we do see lower levels of turnout in the mid-term elections in El Salvador and the 
Dominican Republic and in the legislative elections in Colombia and Venezuela. In the latter 
country, the opposition boycotted the legislative voting and turnout ended up being just 25% of 
registered voters. Next comes Colombia, the country which continues to have the lowest turnout 
rate in the region, with 40.5%. The highest turnout is observed in the Dominican Republic (58%), 
followed by El Salvador with 52.5%, but still below the average for turnout in presidential 
elections. As for voting in processes of direct democracy, i.e. referendums, here is there is no single 
trend, either. While Panama registered low turnout (43%), Bolivia posted the highest figure of its 
electoral history (84.51%), a percentage that equals that of the presidential election of December 
2005.  
 
Table 12. Latin America: Turnout in presidential elections in 2005-2006 
Country Turnout in the previous election (%) 
Turnout in the last 
election (%) 
Bolivia 72.10   (2002) ↑ 84.50   (2005) 
Brazil 82.26   (2002) ↑ 83.25   (2006) 
Chile 89.94   (1999) ↓ 87.67   (2005) 
Colombia 46.47   (2002) ↓ 45.04   (2006) 
Costa Rica 68.86   (2002) ↓ 65.20   (2006) 
Ecuador 64.98   (2002) ↑ 72.20   (2006) 
Honduras 66.30   (2001) ↓ 55.08   (2005) 
Mexico 64.00   (2000) ↓ 58.57   (2006) 
Nicaragua 79.42   (2001) ↓ 78.00 a (2006) 
Peru 82.28   (2001) ↑ 88.70   (2006) 
Venezuela 56.50   (2000)        ↑ 74.36 b  (2006) 
a Preliminary figure provided by Roberto Rivas, chairman of the Electoral Council of Nicaragua. 
b Preliminary figure from the National Electoral Council of Venezuela, with 98.29% of the records examined. 
Source: the author. 
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The legitimacy of political parties 
The Latinobarómetro 2006 shows that political parties continue to suffer from a crisis of credibility 
(although to a lesser extent than in previous surveys) and that the vast majority of people in the 
region feel that there can be no democracy without such institutions. One of the main effects of the 
flurry of elections in Latin America was to reverse the trend observed since 2000, when most 
people said they would not vote for a political party. In 2006 the percentage of those who say they 
would vote for a party rose from 49 to 53%, while those who say they would not dropped from 51 
to 47%. In my opinion, electoral competition revitalizes the validity of political parties.  
 
Close results 
Of the 11 presidential elections, in four countries the results were close (Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Mexico and Peru), giving rise to complaints and challenges before election authorities and public 
opinion. In three cases, (Costa Rica, Honduras and Peru) the dispute was settled through 
institutional means. But in Mexico, the results were not accepted by the opposition party (PRD), 
triggering a post-election crisis that left the country with an atmosphere of political instability.  
 
Another trend in the region was for there to be delays in counting of ballots and announcement of 
winners by electoral authorities. In Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru, the counting 
of votes was slower than usual, and the official announcement of a winner took days, weeks or 
months. The case that stands out most was that of Mexico, where the Electoral Tribunal of the 
Judicial Branch declared Felipe Calderón of the PAN party to be winner two months after the 
election. In Ecuador, the company E-Vote delayed the process: after alleging technical problems, it 
suspended the counting when 30% of the ballot still had to be tallied.20 
 
Graph 3. Vote for a Political Party (1996-2006) 
                                                 
20  The problems started after polling stations had closed and vote-counting was under way. The TSE hired the 
Brazilian company E-Vote to carry out a so-called quick count, in which the country would know the result of the 
presidential voting accurately, although not officially, around 7 pm on election day, and would know the result of the 
legislative election the next day. None of this happened. Late into the night of the election and into the wee hours of the 
next day, E-Vote had counted only 70% of the votes in the presidential race, and the results of the legislative voting 
were not announced at all. The TSE was forced to annul the contract with this company and execute guarantees. 
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In general, these last elections seem to indicate a setback in the administration of elections. 
Technical management and election commissions’ difficulties in making the results official in 
several countries have caused serious doubts about these institutions in two respects: 1) their 
impartiality and 2) with regard to the technical efficiency of the vote-counting and the broadcasting 
of the results. In a region where complaints of fraud, manipulation and inefficiency by electoral 
bodies had decreased significantly, the questioning of these institutions and of the transparency of 
election-related acts amounts to a serious institutional setback.  
 
These problems also led to greater dependence on international observer and monitor missions to 
guarantee electoral decisions, although at times their evaluations were also called into question. For 
example: Hugo Chávez’s refusal to allow an observer mission from the OAS for the legislative 
elections of December; the PRD’s questioning of a European Union observer mission in Mexico, 
and Correa’s objections to an OAS mission in Ecuador. In Nicaragua, early on in the process, 
Ortega questioned the representative of the OAS mission, but later an intervention by the OAS 
secretary general resolved the impasse. 
 
Citizen perception of elections 
According to the Latinobarómetro 2006, during this year people’s perception that elections were 
clean rose: the figure went from 37% in 2005 to 41% in 2006. At the same time the perception that 
elections were fraudulent declined from 54 to 49%.21 However, much work remains to be done in 
changing people’s perceptions: there were only five countries (Costa Rica, Chile, Panama, Uruguay 
and Venezuela) where a majority said elections are clean. In the other 13 countries of the region, 
this opinion is held by less than 50% of voters (the last time elections were held). 
 
                                                 
21  On this issue it is of particular interest to wait for the Latinobarómetro 2007 to see how complaints of electoral 
fraud in 2006 are reflected in Latin Americans’ perceptions. 
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Graph 4. Clean or Rigged Elections (1995 – 2006) 
 
 
It is also worth pointing out that the Latinobarómetro shows a drop in the perception of fraud in 
most countries. Most notable is Mexico, which went from 55 to 20%; next came Ecuador, which 
fell from 30 to 12%; Bolivia declined from 33 to 17% and Nicaragua saw its number go from 22 to 
11%. Other countries also saw these figures go down. Venezuela posted the smallest decrease (the 
number edged down from 29 to 27%), while in Chile the figure was unchanged at (15%). 
 
The ‘democratic normalization’ of Bolivia and Ecuador 
In Bolivia and Ecuador the elections represented these countries’ ‘democatic normalization.’ In the 
Bolivian case, the triumph of Evo Morales came after the political crisis that began with the early 
departure of President Sánchez de Lozada in 2003. This led to short presidencies for Carlos Mesa 
and then the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Eduardo Rodríguez. In the case of Ecuador, the 
election came after the so-called ‘Rebellion of the outlaws‘ that opposition parties mounted in 2005 
against president Gutiérrez. This movement brought about his resignation and Congress named 
Alfredo Palacio as president. 
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Graph 5. Clean or Rigged Elections (2006) 
 
 
Graph 6. Vote Buying (2002-2006)  
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Women’s political participation 
The elections in the 2005-2006 period yielded progress in the area of political participation by 
women. This began with the general elections in Honduras, where a new rule setting minimum 
quotas for male and female candidates (30%) led to an increase in participation by women in 
Congress. The figure went from 6% in the previous legislature to 23% in the current one. This 
positive effect continued in Chile, where the historic election of 2006 saw Michelle Bachelet 
become the first female president of that country. Bachelet has worked to bring more women into 
political posts, establishing a formula mandating equal numbers of men and women in the 3,500 
jobs that are designated by the Chilean presidency.  
 
The number of women elected to the national congress rose in most countries. Although the 
increase was most significant in Honduras, Peru’s increase from 18 to 29% is also worth pointing 
out. The success of women in this country is seen in the fact that the six most-voted lawmakers 
were women. The legislature’s speaker is also a woman. In the rest of the countries, the percentage 
of women elected to Congress was lower, and in some cases it even declined, such as in Bolivia and 
Colombia. 
 
Table 13. Latin America: Women in parliament (lower house or single chamber legislature) 
Before the last 
election After the last election  Country 
% women % women 
Difference 
Bolivia 19 17 –2 
Brazil 9 9 — 
Chile 13 16 +3 
Colombia 13 9 –4 
Costa Rica 35 39 +4 
Ecuador 16 20 +4 
El Salvador 11 17 +6 
Honduras 6 23 +17 
Mexico 23 23 — 
Nicaragua 21 RC* — 
Peru 18 29 +11 
Dominican Republic 17 20 +3 
Venezuela 10 18 +8 
* Results tallied as of  13/11/2006. 
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union and the author 
 
Finally we should point out the results of the elections to the Constituent Assembly in Bolivia. As a 
result of an innovative electoral formula (three-name districts) combined with a gender quota of 
30%, a total of 33% of the people elected to the assembly were women. The assembly also elected 
an indigenous woman as its speaker.  
 
Other relevant aspects 
To one extent or another, the issue of political financing and its relation to corruption has been 
present in the vast majority of the election campaigns. Scandals involving money in politics, rising 
campaign costs, mainly the part spent on ads – above all on television – and the weakness of 
legislation and control mechanisms have made this issue one of the main factors to consider when it 
comes to guaranteeing election fairness and transparency.  
 
The increase in reports of illegal financing and its relation to political corruption scandals coincides 
with a new and negative evaluation of Latin America by the organization called Transparency 
International (TI). Its Corruption Perception Index (CPI)22 allows for the countries of the region 
to be classified into three groups. The first is made up of countries with high CPI levels placing 
them among the top 50 countries on the list. They include Chile (a CPI of 7.3, placing it in 20th 
place) and Uruguay (6.4 on the CPI, 28th place). A second group of seven countries -- Colombia, 
                                                 
22  The CPI is a compound index that measures public perceptions about corruption in 163 countries. It works on a 
scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the highest level of perceived corruption and 10 the lowest.  
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Costa Rica, Brazil, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama and Peru – have a score of between 5 and 3, 
which suggests a worrisome perception of internal corruption. A third group of nine countries 
accounting for half of Latin America -- Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Dominican Republic and Venezuela- have CPI levels below 3, meaning they 
perceive political corruption as being at very high levels in their countries.23 
 
A second issue that has taken on importance is the function of public opinion polls. Several 
elections have shown pollsters had a hard time picking up on trends and predicting results. As 
Carlos Fara says, the elections of these past 14 months were full of surprises. Wasn’t Morales 
supposed to fall short of a majority? Wasn’t Arias supposed to win by a landslide in Costa Rica? 
Wasn’t Alan García supposed to fail to once again be president of Peru? Wasn’t Manuel López 
Obrador supposed to be the clear winner of the elections in Mexico? And wasn’t Correa supposed 
to win in the first round?24 After taking on an important role as a source of information for the 
media on people’s preferences, polls failed to predict winners in Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador and Mexico, among other countries, and became the focus of political debate in Latin 
America.  
 
In Bolivia, just days before the election, polls said Morales would win around 34% of the votes. In 
the end, he won 54%. In Costa Rica, the polls showed Oscar Arias with a big lead over the rest of 
the candidates, but this did not bare out and ultimately he won by a slim margin of just 18,169 votes 
(1.12%). The explanation of these failures lies in the already well-known limitations of polls as 
instruments of measurement. And the limitations grow much more in volatile contexts with 
significant levels of indefinition, high levels of hidden votes, etc. Meanwhile, another factor 
limiting the accuracy of polls is the fact that more and more people get interested in an election just 
weeks or days before it is held, and make up their minds on election day itself. These tend to be the 
youngest voters, people in rural areas or people from working-class districts. These voters don’t go 
by the rationality of candidates’ proposals but rather emotional stimuli such as television footage – 
in other words, what a candidate transmits and the sensations it triggers. For this reason, the last 
impression a candidate makes on voters is so important.  
 
And thus it is also important for polling organizations to warn of the limitations in each case, so that 
the detected level of voter volatility is recorded and stated properly. Unfortunately, this almost 
never happens. At the same time it is worth pointing out that polls – which are supposed to be tools 
of political measurement – have instead been transformed in many cases into means of political 
propaganda. It is true that many parties hire polling firms to measure their levels of support, and 
publish results as part of their campaign strategy. Because of this and the fact that polls are being 
used to serve political interests, their accuracy is being questioned more and more.  
 
Finally, a third issue that should be pointed out is the nature of the campaigns prior to elections and 
their growing ‘Americanization.’ The phenomenon is growing, and characterized by politics 
focused on personalities, the pre-eminence of candidates over parties, increasing use of television, 
and negative campaigns that stress attacks on opponents rather than debate on actual ideas. The 
political campaigns in Brazil, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Mexico, Peru and other countries played out 
this way.  
 
                                                 
23  Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perception Index 2006’: 
www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2006/es_2006_11_06_cpi_2006 
24 Carlos Fara, ‘Surprises in Latin America’, 19/10/2006: www.cadal.org/articulos/nota.asp?id_nota=1463 
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New calendar: more elections 
Although in the next few years the region will not undergo a new flurry of elections like the one 
discussed in this article, there are in fact numerous and important elections scheduled from 2007 
through 2009. During this period, nine of the 18 countries of Latin America – half the region – will 
hold presidential elections: Guatemala and Argentina (2007), Paraguay and the Dominican 
Republic (2008), and El Salvador, Chile, Honduras, Panama and Uruguay (2009). 
 
Table 14. Latin America: Presidential elections 2005-2009 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Southern Cone 
Argentina   X   
Brazil  X    
Chile X    X 
Paraguay    X  
Uruguay     X 
Andean Region 
Bolivia X     
Colombia   X    
Ecuador  X    
Peru  X    
Venezuela  X    
Central America and the Caribbean 
Costa Rica  X    
El Salvador     X 
Guatemala   X   
Honduras X    X 
Mexico  X    
Nicaragua  X    
Panama     X 
Dominican Republic    X  
Source: the author. 
 
Final Comments 
The successful holding of the busiest and most important electoral schedule since the return of 
democracy to Latin America (starting in 1978) and the peaceful renewal via elections of 11 
presidents (12 if we include Haiti) in just 14 months shows that this has been a clear triumph for 
democracy, especially for electoral democracy. The region witnessed an intense electoral period 
that showcased citizens’ desire to seek political answers through elections and democratic 
processes. At the same time, during these 14 months not only has there been no president who had 
to end his term ahead of schedule, but rather the elections have been an instrument for expressing 
the will of the citizens.  
 
This burst of electoral activity came in a context of moderate optimism in which economic growth 
has been one of the most important and undisputed achievements of the period 2005-06. The main 
cause of this strong macroeconomic situation is the high price of raw materials exported from Latin 
America. However, while Latin America has posted five straight years of economic growth and in 
the last four the rate has been above 4% (something which had not happened in years), it is also true 
that it is the region of the developing world with the lowest growth rates and the one with the least 
social progress, with only very small declines in poverty and indigence.  
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The robust economic situation has been reflected in a moderate rise in support for democracy and 
satisfaction with it,25 as well as a rise people’s expectations for the ability of recently elected 
governments to deliver, according to the Latinobarómetro 2006. So 2007 and the years after that 
will become the  moment of truth – the chance to fulfil or miss all those campaign promises. 
 
The keys to the new leaders’ ability to govern democratically will include effective and successful 
handling of these expectations. People want them to deliver on promises of goods and services 
(especially jobs, reduction of poverty and inequality, less street crime and fighting corruption). 
Otherwise, growing frustration with unfulfilled campaign promises could fuel a new cycle of 
instability and the early departure of presidents, or, even worse, violence in some countries. 
 
Politically, the presidential elections did not bring about the ‘leftist tsunami’ that many simplistic 
and alarmist analysts predicted. Rather, it was a shift toward the centre, with three separate political 
tendencies: social democrat, nationalist-populist left, and centre-right. And although the victories of 
Correa, Ortega and Chávez, preceded by that of Morales, could give rise to the idea that the 
nationalist-populist trend is dominant, the fact is that, as Rosendo Fraga warns, ‘[it is worth noting 
that [within this line] none of the region’s five largest electorates are included (Brazil, Mexico, 
Colombia, Argentina and Peru). Altogether they account for four-fifths of the population.’ Fraga 
argues that as a result of all this, Latin America is now  
 
a more heterogeneous region in which the leadership of Chávez is beginning to find limits and 
Brazil is trying to act more as a moderator than a leader. The influence of the US is low, although 
hostility toward this country is less than it was a year ago. The death of Pinochet and Castro’s 
illness served in 2006 as symbols of the end of a cycle that lasted more than half a century, a period 
in which communist guerrillas on one hand and anti-communist governments on the other 
weakened democracy in the region for decades.26 
 
Furthermore, old-style authoritarianism characterized by coups d’Etat is no long an option and has 
been replaced by a tendency toward neo-populism. As a UNDP report on Democracy in Latin 
America (2004)27 states, ‘today opposition movements do not tend to seek military solutions but 
rather populist leaders who bill themselves as being removed from traditional power and promise 
innovative prospects.’ The study said the discontent of the peoples of Latin America is not ‘with’ 
democracy but rather ‘in’ democracy, and as we have stated several times, problems ‘in’ democracy 
are resolved with more and better democracy. For this reason Peter Hakim said the biggest danger 
for democracy in Latin America is not demagogue politicians or military officers with visions of 
grandeur or authoritarian ideologies. The biggest threat is continuous mediocre performance – the 
inability of democratic governments to meet the most important needs and demands of its people. 28 
 
Meanwhile, although the democracies of Latin America have defied forecasts predicting they would 
not last long and displayed a heretofore unknown electoral vitality, they have also made clear that 
their consolidation is more complex and needs more time than originally thought. As Botana29 
warns, after nearly three decades of transition many of these democracies have yet to establish roots 
in the State, in society and in political parties. We have crossed the first threshold cleanly – the 
electoral dimension, the one which certainly gives rise to the most advances. But we still have a 
long way to go in the consolidation of the republic, the balance of powers and the rule of law. Ours 
                                                 
25 According to the Latinobarómetro, support for democracy rose from 53% in 2005 to 58% in 2006,  and satisfaction 
with democracy went from 31% to 38%, Informe Latinobarómetro 2006,: www.latinobarometro.org 
26 Rosendo Fraga, ‘Three trends in the region’, La Nación, Buenos Aires, 17/1/2007.  
27 PNUD, Democracy in Latin America: Moving toward a Democracy of Citizens, UNDP,  2004, p. 12. 
28 Quoted by Ignacio Walter, ‘Democracy in Latin America, 2006’ www.cadal.org/documentos/documento_54.pdf 
29 Natalio Botana, ‘Democracy in Latin America’, La Nación, Buenos Aires, 29/10/2006:  
www.lanacion.com.ar/opinion/columnistas/columnistasnotasanteriores.asp?origen=3ra&columnista_id=618 
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are democracies characterized by a clear institutional weakness, by a rule of law with limited force 
and by low-intensity citizenry.  
Thus, it is so important to move ahead urgently and firmly in the strengthening and perfecting of 
political institutions, being able to rely on ones that are representative, legitimate and efficient as 
they serve as the basis for the full functioning of democracy. People committed to democracy are 
also essential. In other words, both institutions and political leadership matter dearly, not just for the 
survival of democracy but also its quality. A mixed approach is essential, one that combines the 
institutional dimension and the behaviour of leaders: cultural contexts and leadership are not just 
important in designing institutions but also in their management and workings. Strong and 
representative democratic institutions, accompanied by quality leadership and a democratic culture, 
are the best means to protect against anti-politics, messianic leaders and the dangers of neo-
populism.  
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